Former SC Trudgill

POLICE (CONDUCT) REGULATIONS 2020

As amended by the Police (Conduct) (Amendment) Regulations

CONCERNING:

Officer: Former Special Constable 7347 George Trudgill

Norfolk Constabulary

Case: CM 47/25

Accelerated Misconduct Hearing

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Final Written Report

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Introduction

1.0 This is the record of determinations made by the Chair at an accelerated misconduct proceeding brought under the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 as amended (the Regulations) against former Special Constable 7347 George Trudgill.

1.1  The Special Constable, was not in attendance and was not represented by legal counsel or the police federation. The Special Constable had resigned before the Hearing. The Hearing was bound by the former officer provisions under regulations and guidance.

1.2 The Constabulary had issued a special conditions certificate in accordance with Regulation 49(4) Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 indicating that there was sufficient evidence, in the form of written statements or other documents, to establish on the balance of probabilities that his conduct constitutes gross misconduct and that it was in the public interest for him to be included on the police barred list.

1.3 Special Constabulary officers, whilst volunteers, hold the same powers and ‘office of constable’ as regular police officers and are therefore subject to the same standards of professional behaviour and conduct regime.

1.4 The Chair, sitting alone, was Assistant Chief Officer Nicholas Davison (Former Assistant Chief Constable).

1.5 The Appropriate Authority (AA) was represented Detective Chief Inspector Banks.

1.6 The Hearing was a public hearing and was held at Norfolk Constabulary, Operations and Communications Centre, Falconers Chase, Wymondham, Norfolk on Friday 14^th August 2026.

 

The Role of the Chair

2.0 The person conducting or chairing the accelerated misconduct hearing must review the facts of the case and decide whether or not the conduct of the officer concerned amounts to gross misconduct. The person conducting or chairing the accelerated misconduct hearing must not find that the conduct of the officer concerned amounts to gross misconduct unless:

(a) they are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that this is the case, or

(b) the officer admits it is the case.

 

Preliminary Matters

3.0 The Chair first addressed whether it was right to proceed with the hearing in the absence of the former special constable. The AA applied to continue the hearing in the former officer’s absence, citing the authorities R v Hayward [2001] QB 862; R v Jones [2002] UKHL 5 and GMC v Adeogba [2016] EWCA Civ 162 at [13],[17] and [18]. Additionally, the Chair considered the Home Office guidance (2020) to the regulations paragraph 11.106 [137] and paragraph 12.16 [148].

3.1 In support of this application the AA presented a written timeline of contact [supplementary bundle p3- 20] with the former officer and a body worn video showing the service of the case papers on the former special constable.

3.2 The Chair found that, the former officer had the opportunity to attend but had voluntarily absented himself from the hearing; was aware of the case against him, had been informed of his right to legal representation and that nothing would be gained by adjourning proceedings. Therefore, the Chair determined that the hearing would proceed in his absence.

3.3 The AA applied for part of the hearing to be held in private relating to sensitive information and for a reporting restriction order to be made regarding that information. The Chair heard the AAs submission and made a ruling to that effect.

 

Allegations

4.0 The Chair was referred to a Regulation 51 notice in respect of the former special constable containing the allegations and that his conduct amounted to gross misconduct, namely:

Whilst serving as a Special Constable in Norfolk Constabulary on the 26 May 2022 and while on duty you accessed CAD SC-20052022-173 by way of a targeted search at 15:39hrs by entering the CAD number into Webstorm.

The CAD related to a report from a [redacted] that a [redacted] was a missing person, having left the [redacted] saying that [redacted] was going to kill [reacted]self.

There was no policing purpose for your accessing the CAD. Further, the accessing was aggravated by the following:

1. 1. The accessing was in breach of the Data Protection Act.
   2. The information contained on the CAD included both personal data and sensitive personal data.
   3. The CAD related to a juvenile who was vulnerable.
   4. You personally knew the juvenile through your work [Redacted].
   5. [Redacted].

Standards of Professional Behaviour

Your behaviour as set out above has breached the following Standards of Professional Behaviour:

Confidentiality Police officers treat information with respect and access or disclose it only in the proper course of police duties. Your accessing of the CAD had no policing purpose.

 Discreditable Conduct Police officers behave in a manner which does not discredit the police service or undermine public confidence in it, whether on or off duty. Accessing personal data, including sensitive personal data in respect of a juvenile without a policing purpose brings discredit upon the police service and undermines public confidence in it.

Your behaviour is so serious as to amount to gross misconduct.

 

Former Special Constables response

5.0 The former special constable had disengaged from the process entirely and there was no response to the allegations. The Chair proceeded on the basis that the facts of the case and allegations needed to be proven by the AA.

 

Evidence

6.0 The AA set out its evidence in its written opening note and relied upon the material set out in the case bundle [1-134] and supplementary case bundle [1-62].

 

Approach taken by the Chair

7.0 The Chair reminded himself that the burden of proof lies with the AA and is discharged on the balance of probabilities (more likely than not). The Chair reminded himself of the Home Office guidance (2020) concerning the burden and standard of proof at paragraph 9.10 and 9.11.

7.1 The Chair considered all the evidence he heard. The findings have been based on the evidence, including inferences properly drawn from the evidence. The Chair did not have the benefit of hearing oral evidence from the former special constable.

7.2 The Chair approached his decision on the following basis: -

(i) First, to ascertain the facts whether admitted or found proven.

(ii) Second to determine whether based on those facts the officer breached the Standard of Professional Behaviour (“the Standards”) as set out in Schedule 2 to the Regulations.

(iii) Third, if yes, to decide whether such breaches constituted misconduct or gross misconduct.

(iv) Fourth, dependent on the findings under (ii) and (iii), to decide on the appropriate outcome, within the constraints of the former officer provisions.

 

Findings of Facts (Stage 1)

8.0 The Chair found all facts proven on the balance of probabilities.

8.1 The Chair found proven that George Trudgill served as a special constable with Norfolk Constabulary on 26^th May 2022 and that while on duty that day he assessed CAD SC-20052022-173 at 15:39hrs via the webstorm system. The Chair did so based on the special constabulary duties records [bundle page 69] which shows him on duty that day from 1300hrs to 22:15hrs and the audit report that shows he assessed the CAD record at 15:39hrs and viewed its contents [bundle page 81].

8.2 The Chair found proven that the CAD record related to a report from [redacted] that a [redacted] was a missing person, having left [redacted] saying that [redacted] was going to kill [redacted]self. The Chair did so having read the CAD and its contents [bundle page 29].

8.3 The Chair found proven that the CAD contained both personal data and personal sensitive data from reading the CAD log [bundle page 29-43]

8.4 The Chair, whilst having no formal or informal response or understanding from the former special constable as he has disengaged from the process, found he had no policing purpose. He did not attend the initial incident on the day of the CAD, he had no policing purpose in his role to make enquiries. His duty that day was ‘patrol’ in D2 area [bundle p69]. The [redacted] location was in Suffolk, and he was a Norfolk special constable.

8.5 The Chair further found proven that the CAD related to a vulnerable juvenile from viewing the content of the CAD [ bundle p29-43]. The CAD log sets out the vulnerability.

8.6 The Chair fund proven that Special Constable Trudgill knew the juvenile personally through his work [redacted] as he admitted knowing [redacted] in the [redacted] investigatory meeting held on 14/07/2025 [bundle page 84].

8.7 [Redacted].

8.8 The Chair found proven that accessing the CAD log and gaining the person data was a breach of the Data Protection Act set out in the force policy documents Acceptable use of information systems and assets procedure and the Data Protection Policy document in the supplementary bundle [bundle pages 21 – 62].

8.9 The Data Protection Policy applies to all officers, staff and volunteers working for the constabulary [supplementary p23]. It sets out a data breach as unauthorised access [p31]. Its sets out in the policy the criminal offences and responsibilities of staff specifically S170 DPA 2018 unlawful obtaining of personal data [p35].

8.10 The Acceptable Use of Information Systems and Assets policy sets out the acceptable use of the force systems [p40] and that it is clear guidance and applicable to all staff[p41]. That access to police information systems must be for a legitimate policing purpose only and that individuals are accountable for all actions when using such systems [p42/43].

8.11 The responsibilities are continued within the Acceptable Use of Information Systems and assets procedure document [p46-62]. In particular staff are only permitted to access assets for legitimate purposes and that access to the organisations systems and information is controlled using the principle of least privilege (need to know basis).

8.12 The former special constables’ actions breached these policies and procedures.

 

Determination of whether the facts proven amount to a breach of the Standard of Professional Behaviour (Stage 2)

9.0 Whilst clear that he was determining whether there are breaches to the Police Conduct Regulations Standards of Professional Behaviour the Chair looked to the Police Code of Ethics relevant at the time [2014] to assist in his assessment against those regulation definitions.

Confidentiality

The Code of Ethics states:

I will treat information with respect and access or disclose it only in the proper course of my duties.

According to this standard you must:

• • be familiar with and abide by the data protection principles described in the Data Protection Act 1998
  • access police-held information for a legitimate or authorised policing purpose only. understand that by accessing personal data without authorisation you could be committing a criminal offence, regardless of whether you then disclose that personal data.

9.1        There is no legitimate policing purpose identified. In accessing the computer system for a non-policing purpose as the Chair found proven the former special constable was not abiding by the data protection principles.

 

Conduct

The Code of Ethics at the time states:

I will behave in a manner, whether on duty or off duty which does not bring discredit on the police service or undermine public confidence in policing.

• As a police officer, member of police staff or other person working for the police service, you must keep in mind at all times that the public expect you to maintain the highest standards of behaviour. You must, therefore, always think about how a member of the public may regard your behaviour, whether on or off duty.
• You should ask yourself whether a particular decision, action or omission might result in members of the public losing trust and confidence in the policing profession.
• Examples of meeting this standard are when you: that may bring the police service into disrepute and damage the relationship of trust and confidence between the police and the public.

9.2 By accessing sensitive police systems for a non-policing purpose, the former Special Constable has not maintained the highest standards of behaviour, and he has acted in a way to damage the relationship of trust and confidence between the police and the public.

9.3 Having considered the Police code of ethics relevant at the time the Chair considered the professional standards as defined in the regulations and considered whether the facts found proven saw the standards engaged and breached.

9.4 The definitions being:

Confidentiality: Police officers treat information with respect and access or disclose it only in the proper course of police duties.

Discreditable Conduct: Police officers behave in a manner which does not discredit the police service or undermine public confidence in it, whether on or off duty. Police officers report any action taken against them for a criminal offence, any conditions imposed on them by a court or the receipt of any penalty notice.

9.5 In doing so the Chair found the standards were engaged and breached.

 

Assessment of Misconduct (Stage 3)

10.0 The Chair had regard to regulation 61(15) of the Conduct regulations which provides that the person conducting the misconduct proceedings must:

In the case of a former officer misconduct hearing review the facts of the case and decide whether the conduct of the officer concerned amounts to gross misconduct or not.

10.1 The Chair reminded himself of the definition of Gross misconduct under regulations (schedule 2). That being:

 a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour that is so serious as to justify dismissal.

10.2 In coming to his determination of whether its gross misconduct or not the Chair drew from the College of Policing guidance on Outcomes in Police Misconduct (2023) to assist in differentiating between the definitions.

Culpability

The Chair found the conduct was:

• • Intentional, deliberate and targeted.
  • It was criminal in nature
  • It was misuse of a police computer system. There was no proper policing purpose. There was no accidental access. It contravened data protection principles.

Harm

• • The Chair determined that the former special constables’ actions undermine public confidence in policing.
  • That there is national concern regarding police officers and office of constable holders accessing sensitive information systems for their own use and purpose.

10.3 Having considered the definitions under conduct regulations at schedule 2, the Chair found the proven facts and the breaches of the standards of professional behaviour amount to gross misconduct.

 

Assessment of Seriousness of the Misconduct and Outcome (Stage 4)

11.0 The Chair received and considered submissions on outcome from the AA. The Chair took into consideration the former officers record of service. The Chair noted his training record and the training he received and completed on data legislation, information security, webstorm access and his data legislation declaration all completed before this incident.

11.1 The Chair reminded himself not to double count in his assessment of seriousness.

11.2 The Chair followed the procedure set out in the College of Guidance on Outcomes in Police misconduct proceedings 2023 and the approach require as set out in Fuglers LLP v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2014] EWHC 179 (Admin), namely:

Stage 1: Assess the seriousness of the misconduct (based on (i) the officer’s culpability (ii) harm caused by the misconduct (iii) the existence of any aggravating factors (iv) the existence of any mitigating factors).

Stage 2: Keep in mind the purposes for which an outcome is imposed.

Stage 3: Choose the outcome which most appropriately fulfils those purposes given the seriousness of the conduct.

11.3 Having received submissions from the AA the Chair considered those submissions and re visited, but for the purpose of the assessment of seriousness his earlier assessment at stage three above. The Chair adopted the culpability and the harm assessment made at stage 3 and went on to consider aggravating and mitigating features. The Chair considered the following aggravating and mitigating factors relevant in this case:

Aggravating factors

• Vulnerable nature of the child both because a child and their specific circumstances.
• significant deviation from instructions, whether an order, force policy or national guidance.
• multiple breaches of standards.

Mitigating Factors

• misconduct confined to a single episode or brief duration.

 

Assessment

11.4 The Chair ‘s assessment of the seriousness of the misconduct found proven was that culpability was high and Harm was high. It amounted to serious gross misconduct.

 

Personal Mitigation

12.0 Personal mitigation is always to be considered but its impact in misconduct proceedings is limited. In this case there was no personal mitigation available.

 

Outcome

13.0 The Chair reminded himself of the threefold propose of the police misconduct regime, namely:

1. to maintain public confidence in, and the reputation of, the police service.
2. to uphold high standards in policing and to deter misconduct.
3. to protect the public.

13.1 As a former officer case, the Chair consider two possible outcomes - disciplinary action or no disciplinary action. The Chair concluded that former Special constable’s conduct, taken as a whole, was so serious that the only appropriate action would be disciplinary action.

13.2 The Chair considered less severe outcomes before more severe outcomes. The Chair determined that a final written warning of any duration would not adequately fulfil the purposes of the regime. Police systems contain extremely sensitive information, and, in this case, it set out the vulnerable position the child was in having run away indicating self-harm. The Public rightly expect that the police service and its staff respect the privileged access to these sensitive systems and do not access them for non-policing purposes. Nothing less that dismissal without notice would be appropriate for the seriousness of the misconduct or satisfy the purpose of the regime.

13.3 Had former Special Constable George Trudgill been a serving special constable he would have been dismissed.

 

Police Barring List

14.0 The AA is to comply with the requirements set out in the Home Office guidance 2020 concerning the Police Barred List and Police Advisory List regulations 2017. Namely, apply to have the former special constable placed on the police barring list.

 

Publication

15.0 The AA is directed to publish the final report and name the former special constable. Following the outcome the Chair revisited the direction given at the commencement of proceedings under regulation 59(2) (a) and (c). The Chair determined his ruling remained in force. Both the private hearing and the reporting restrictions concerning Fact 5 in the allegation and case remain in place.

 

Appeal

16.0 The former special constable has a right to Appeal. The Chair directed the hearings manager to assist the former officer in the understanding of that.

 

ACO Nicholas Davison

Chair

18/08/2026